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The aim of this paper is not only to deal with the concept of infinity, but also to develop some considerations about the epistemological status of cosmology. These problems are connected because from an epistemological point of view, cosmology, meant as the study of the universe as a whole, is not merely a physical (or empirical) science. On the contrary it has an unavoidable metaphysical character which can be found in questions like “why is there this universe (or a universe at all)?”. As a consequence, questions concerning the infinity of the universe in space and time can correctly arise only taking into account this metaphysical character of cosmology. Accordingly, in the following paper it will be shown that two different concepts of  physical infinity of the universe (the relativistic one and the inflationary one) rely on two different ways of solution of a metaphysical problem. The difference between these concepts cannot be analysed using the classical distinctions between actual/potential infinity or numerable/continuum infinity, but the introduction of a new “modal” distinction will be necessary. Finally, it will be illustrated the role of a philosophical concept of infinity of the universe.

1. Introduction.
From a historical point of view, cosmology is mainly a philosophical subject. From Greek mythology to thought in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, the problem of the cosmos was placed to the limit, or more often out, of scientific research. This is due to the fact that the aim of cosmology has a clear philosophical sound: the study of universe as a whole. It is evident the such an aim is distinctly different from the astronomical one (cataloguing and classifying heavenly bodies) or from the astrophysical one (applying physical theories to cosmic processes), typically scientifically studied subjects. Only since the past century, thanks to the developments of general relativity, cosmology finally could rely on a firm and confirmed physical theory. As of 1917, when the cosmological meaning of relativistic equations for the gravitational field was understood, great improvements in the characterisation of the “global” properties of the universe were done. Nevertheless, the problem on infinity, which was the one that kept Kant in check, is still open. In the following, we will try to clarify the status of the problem of infinity in cosmology and we will try to show the root of this problem is in an epistemological question placed in foundations of cosmology itself. Indeed, the attempts to take cosmology back to a physical theory, cannot deny the relevance of its philosophical character out, and, on the contrary, we will show that just this reduction implies a philosophical foundation for cosmology. Two different solutions to the problem of foundation are possible and they lead to two different notions of infinity in cosmology.

2. Epistemological status of cosmology.
As it was said, cosmology is a particular subject, which has a deep philosophical root, but, in the meantime, which was subjected to accurate physical studies, especially starting from the last century. These premises given, it is no wonder that cosmology enjoys a certain epistemological specificity, which distinguishes it essentially from physics. But, this fact arises the question to define the conditions for a reduction, at least partial, of cosmology to physics. The epistemological specificity is divided into two levels.








then the nocturnal sky should appear very bright, rather then dark. It is not sufficient to assume that light was absorbed by the matter dividing us from stars, because, if the universe were temporally infinite, the matter would already come to the thermodynamic equilibrium with thermal radiation, and it would emit the same quantity of radiation it absorbs. On the contrary, the paradox disappears if it is assumed that the universe has existed since a finite time and the effects due to the expansions are introduced. Thus, it is clear that, the passage from the observation of a mere cosmological fact, to the inference of a cosmological property which informs us about the nature of the universe, requires the use of physical theories. The problem of the justification of the application of such theories to the universe as a whole, is still open. We will discuss this point at the end of the paper.
Second, the subject “cosmology” has a character which distinguishes it from empirical sciences like physics. Indeed, in the latter, the so–called arbitrariness of the initial conditions principle holds. The prototype of physical law is a differential equation that allows as to pass from the description of a generic state x at the time t to another state y at  successive (or previous) time t. The essential point is that such a law describes the manner of this passage, regardless the initial and final states The initial conditions (within specified broad conditions) are totally arbitrary in order to make a physical law valid. It is really unthinkable from the point of view of physical methodology that a law changes its form depending on initial conditions, if the general conditions are respected. However, in cosmology the initial conditions are given and they cannot be changed. We have to define the evolutionary laws of the universe as a whole with fixed initial conditions and, actually, we have no guarantee that these laws do not essentially depend on the conditions themselves. But, from an epistemological standpoint, this fact has even deeper consequences.
First of all, we have a experimental consequence: in cosmology, experiments to test cosmological laws cannot be made. We do not have at our disposal another universe to check the behaviour of our models under conditions different from the actual and we cannot change the conditions themselves as we like. Secondly, we have a theoretical consequence too. In fact, if the arbitrariness of the initial conditions principle (and the model of physical law described above) does not hold, then nomological explanation, that is the kind of explanation able to claim a counterfactual conditional, cannot be given. Evidently, if the validity of a law is independent from the initial conditions, then it is, in general, independent also from the fact that initial conditions are given at all. For example, the metals thermal expansion law allows as to give a nomological explanation of expansion because from it the counterfactual conditional: “if we had warmed that metal, it would have been expanded” can be derived. The counterfactual character of this sentence shows the arbitrariness of the initial conditions, that it is the main requirement of any physical law. Accordingly, in cosmology, at least at a global level, nomological explanation cannot be given. They are possible only when the conditions for the application of physics to cosmology are completely defined.
Now, we will try to define these conditions. Physics, as an empirical science, is based on two fundamental requirements: the empirical data as a starting point and the validity of the arbitrariness of the initial conditions principle. From the first point the following condition derives:

Condition [1]. A certain universe exists, characterised by some values of fundamental quantities as the electron charge, Planck’s constant, the speed of light and so on.

But from the second requirement another condition follows:

Condition [2]. In principle, many universes are possible because all the fundamental constants defining our universe have arbitrary values.

Thus, it is clear that, in order to maintain both conditions and to found the application of physics in the cosmological field, some argumentation must be shown that allows us to justify condition [1] starting from condition [2] or, equivalently, to make the inference, called fundamental, from the second condition to the first one. Solving the problem of initial conditions means to justify the fundamental inference. In other words, we have to give an answer to the question: why is there our universe and not another one? It is evident that this question sounds metaphysical. And it is even clearer if it is considered that any kind of justification for the fundamental inference is also (or presupposes) an answer to the question: why, in general, is there universe and not instead nothingness? This is nothing but Heidegger’s fundamental metaphysical question. What is the result of this argumentation? The result is this: the epistemological reduction of cosmology to physics is possible by claiming the fundamental inference which is justifiable only by means of a metaphysical principle. Accordingly, cosmology will be equivalent to physics only within a suitable metaphysical frame. Only within such a frame the application of physics to the cosmological problems has a meaning from an epistemological point of view​[1]​. The foundation of the fundamental inference belongs to this frame as well and, on the philosophical side, the initial conditions problem is solved through a metaphysical way.
We will see further on what these ways consist of. Now it is important to note a second point. The initial conditions problem in cosmology is not only a philosophical problem, but also a physical one. Justifying the application of physics to cosmological questions, we legitimate the physical side of the initial conditions problem as well. From the physical point of view this problem has many aspects. We will consider only two of them, anticipating some concepts which will be discussed in depth in the paragraphs 5 and 6.




for the time  between 0 and t, being c the speed of light. The cosmological horizon problem consists in the fact that the region defined in (3) is finite and less than the dimension of the universe. This means that even not–causally connected regions, namely so far one from the other that any physical process could not involve both yet, are homogeneous and isotropic. Either this fact is the result of an unbelievable coincidence, or we need to explain how it is possible to have a cosmic scale homogeneity, if any process could not connect regions enough far yet.
A second problem concerning the initial conditions is the problem of the flatness of the universe. As it is known from general relativity, the curvature of space depends on the density of the matter of the universe. In particular, in cosmology a critical density c can be defined, which represents the threshold value among the possible curvatures. If the density of the universe is equal to the critical density or, likewise, the density parameter is  = /c = 1, then the universe is flat. Now, if at the beginning of its history, the universe had had a density greater than the critical density, the gravitational attraction would have inverted the expansion too quickly and the universe would have collapsed soon afterwards. On the contrary, if it had had a lower density, it would have expanded too fast. In order to have a universe like ours, whose age is in the order of 1010 years, it would be necessary, from the very beginning, to have  = 1 or very near to 1. Also in this case, either we have an outstanding coincidence or an explanation requiring fact.
Anyway, the point worth noting is that the initial conditions problem has a philosophical side and a physical one. The latter has meaning as soon as the general conditions for solving the former are defined, but, not being given specific conditions for this solution, two faces of the same coin remain. Accordingly, any solution of a side of the initial conditions problem can be transformed in a solution of the other side. In particular, if we try to solve the initial conditions problem with a metaphysical principal, it will have physical applications as well. From the other hand, if we choose as solution a physical theory, it will have also a metaphysical value. In the next paragraph these possible ways will be briefly described.

3. Two ways for a solution.
The initial conditions problem has two sides: a philosophical one and a physical one. Thus, we can expect that the two possible ways resolving it, can be distinguished from this very point of view: in other words, there is a more philosophical and a more physical way. However, dealing with two sides of the same problem, we can expect that a solution has consequences for the other side too.
A first way for solving the fundamental inference from condition [1] to condition [2] is the following. A particular, very general characteristic of our universe is considered and it is raised to the rank of a necessary, namely metaphysical principle. Indeed, if our universe has a necessarily realised characteristic, then the fundamental inference is suddenly justified. This argument found the use of the anthropic principle. In that case the general characteristic is the fact that the universe is able to support human life. The existence of mankind becomes the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of this universe and permits passing from condition [2] to condition [1]. But, to do that, the existence of mankind cannot be a contingent fact but it has to become a necessary one, in order to explain the existence of our universe. So, the presence of mankind becomes a metaphysical principle. The anthropic principle is essentially a philosophical (and metaphysical) principle, but it derives from a scientific context and it has remarkable physical consequences. P. A. M. Dirac introduced it in order to explain the value of the universal constants. In fact, these constants have values included in a very small interval allowing the development of a life feasible universe. But the anthropic principle allows as to explain also some questions connected to the isotropy, to Hubble’s age, and to yield a solution to the initial conditions problem from the physical side. It generally explains the “fine tuning” of some cosmological quantities, namely the fact that these quantities have extraordinary suitable (very small or very large, it depends) values for a certain kind of universe.
The second way consists in privileging the physical side of the initial conditions problem. Thus, this problem attempts to be solved from the physical point of view. Indeed, the fundamental inference can be justified stating that the passage from the state of affairs described by condition [2] to the one described by condition [1] takes place by means of a physical process represented by a suitable theory. Condition [2] works as a epistemological pre–requirement for this theory, while condition [1] works as the result of the process itself and the theory allows passing from one to another. Actually, the theory does nothing but describe a physical process which is the real base for this passage. Such a process is generally called a phase transition with spontaneous breaking of symmetry. This is the central idea of the inflationary model we will see in detail in the paragraph 5. It is worth noting that in this manner is the theory itself, and the process it describes, which assumes a metaphysical meaning. Here, “metaphysical” does not mean literally “beyond physics”, but rather “point of view that allows as to gather something as a whole”. This meaning of the term “metaphysical” is implicit in the notion of “metaphysical frame” we spoke about in the previous paragraph. According to this second way, the physical theory justifying the fundamental inference does not place itself within the metaphysical frame, but it constitutes that and therefore it is “metaphysical” too. It describes the forming process of the universe and it allows us to gather the universe “as a whole”. Moreover, it defines the conditions on which the usual physics can be applied to cosmology.
The difference between these two ways is the following. According to the first way the standard cosmological model, which describes our universe, is as necessary as the universe itself. accordingly, any question, included that of infinity, has sense in this model only. Indeed, any problem concerning the universe as a whole refers to our universe and it is understandable by means of the theory describing our universe only. The second way assumes the theory which justifies the fundamental inference as necessary, namely provided of a metaphysical meaning, then the question of infinity has to arise within this theory and in a context wider than that of our universe. Therefore a complete analysis of the concept of infinity in cosmology requires the inquiry of the meaning of this concept in relativistic cosmology, foundations of the standard cosmological model, and in the inflationary model.

4. Relativistic Cosmology.
The relativistic cosmology relies on two fundamental a priori assumptions. We call them a priori, because they do not derive directly from experience, not being an experience able to confirm or to refute them, but they are assumed for theoretical reasons. First of all, the existence of cosmic time is assumed, namely a unique time for any observer. This fact greatly simplifies the definition of metric because it permits anything without taking into account many difficulties of general relativity. Passing, it is interesting to note that such a notion of time has much more to do with the time of history, the time “within” which the facts happen, than the time of physics.








Thus, the variation of density is independent on spatial co–ordinates, being linked only with the universal constant H. As a consequence, if the universe is homogeneous and isotropic at a certain time, it is so for all the time previous and next as well. Therefore, if the cosmological laws depend on the cosmological principle, the principle itself makes us sure that they always was been (and will be) essentially the same.

























The cosmological equations (9) and (10) yield us some important information about the infinity of the universe in space (geometry) and in time (evolution). From (11) we can note the following. If  > c the curvature is positive. This means that the geometry of the universe is spherical and the universe is spatially finite but unlimited because on a sphere a limit cannot be found. On the contrary, if  < c the curvature is negative, the geometry of the universe is hyperbolic and the universe is spatially infinite and unlimited. If  = c the geometry is the usual Euclidean geometry.




where a0 e H0 represent the present value of the expansion parameter and the Hubble constant respectively. By means of (13) the evolution of the universe can be completely described depending on the ratio between total density and critical density expressed by the parameter . If   > 1 the universe is said closed. It has a starting point in time (big–bang). Moreover, it contains enough matter in order to stop the expansion, where the meaning of “enough” is quantitatively established by the value of c. As a consequence, this universe will expand up to a certain time, after that the expansion will be inverted by the gravitational attraction of the matter and the universe will be brought to a final collapse (big–crunch).
On the contrary, if one has  < 1, then there is not in the universe enough matter to invert the expansion. In this case, the universe has a starting point in time too, but contrarily to the previous case, it will continue its expansion forever.
To sum up, the relativistic cosmology defines a very close relationship between total density of the universe (a complex quantity which the density of matter, of radiation and of neutrinos contribute to), the geometry of the universe and its temporal evolution. If the universe has a high enough density, then it is spatially and temporally finite. Thus, according to the relativistic cosmology in this scenario there is no place for infinity. However, we can also imagine that a new big–bang follows the final collapse. This aspect will be analysed further on. But, if the universe has not a high enough density, then it is spatially and temporally infinite. In this case only, can we think to an infinite universe in the sense of “endless” both in time and in space.




where  is said to be the cosmological constant. From a physical point of view it constitutes a great problem. Indeed, it is connected to an antigravitational repulsive energy which cannot be assigned to the ordinary matter or radiation. Some recent developments showed that it can derive from configurations of the Higg’s field, namely it can be a repulsive force originating from empty space. Anyway, the problem is that this is an energy, namely matter, from a relativistic point of view, and then this is a quantity contributing to the total density of the universe. In the meantime, however, it acts contrary to the ordinary matter, that is, in an antigravitational sense. A break in the simple correlation above mentioned follows because this force acts in a diametrically–opposed way on the spatial configuration and on the temporal evolution. Depending on how much the contribution of the cosmological constant is to the total density of the universe, different scenarios can be ascertained. For suitable values it is possible for the total density to be higher than the critical one, and then for the universe to be geometrically spherical, but if the cosmological constant gives the greatest contribution to the density, an expanding universe can be obtained. In this manner, a spatially finite (and unlimited) but temporally infinite universe could be given.

5. The inflationary model.
The fundamental idea of the inflationary model is a simple one: the universe did not strictu sensu begin with the big–bang. On the contrary, there was a previous era during which the universe itself was expanding very rapidly (a superluminar expansion, namely faster than light). This preliminary era is called inflation era. Afterwards, the inflationary expansion stopped, transforming in a slower expansion just like the present one. Beside the fact the there is no explicit empirical support for this theory, the great problem consists in describing the passage from the inflationary to the big–bang phase. In the inflation theory this passage is thought as a first order phase transition.
Let a system constituted by many parts (many particles or molecules) be given. It can be happen that the system passes, spontaneously or for induction, from a disordered and highly symmetric phase, to a ordered one where some symmetries are lost. This passage is characterised by the appearance of a order parameter  that was equal to zero in the disordered phase. The typical example are the ferromagnets. The internal rotational symmetry of a ferromagnet can be broken by the presence of an external magnetisation M (working here as order parameter) which imposes a privileged direction. It is important to note that this process does not change the fundamental laws describing the system. If the system in the disordered phase is described by a symmetric function, as a Hamiltonian function, the latter holds in the ordered phase as well. In principle, there is still symmetry, but the change of the initial conditions (represented by the presence of the order parameter) imposes a choice among the different symmetric possibilities.
Generally, for a phase transition a critical temperature Tc exists, under which the transition takes place. In the ferromagnetic case this critical value is the Curie’s temperature. Furthermore, two different kind of phase transition can happen. The free energy of such a system is a function of . As the temperature approaches the critical value Tc, the order parameter appears, generating a new absolute minimum in the energy curve. As a consequence, for temperatures less than Tc the system naturally will tend to this new minimum. Such a gradual transition is called second order phase transition.
In the case of first order phase transitions the situation if much more complex. In fact, the order parameter suddenly appears as the critical temperature is reached, but the system does not move immediately toward the new minimum. On the contrary, it remains entrapped in a false minimum conserving the difference of free energy. As the temperature decreases further, the system remains anyway in a disordered phase, (overfreezing) until, a certain temperature T < Tc reached, thermodynamic or quantum fluctuation phenomena free some regions of the system from the false minimum. As the real minimum is reached, the system liberates the latent energy generating a new increase of the temperature up to a critical level (re–heating). This kind of transition is characterised by a deep discontinuity.








which is completely analogous to the equation of a ball rolling on the wall of a hole. The expansion makes the temperature decreasing, bringing it toward a critical value (that in this case is the big–bang initial temperature in standard theory). At this point, the field assumes a new minimum and tends evolving according to equation (16). But, being a phase transition of the first order, the field remains blocked in a false minimum region. Using the previous analogy, it is as if the ball remains entrapped in a hollow in the wall. As a consequence, in this phase, the universe keeps itself in an inflationary expansion also after the temperature decreases under the critical level. However, at a certain point, in some limited regions of the universe called fluctuation regions, the field succeeds in climbing over the barrier of potential, especially thanks to quantum tunnel effects or statistical fluctuations. When  reaches its real minimum, the phenomenon of re–heating takes place, namely a liberation of latent energy and the subsequent increase of the temperature up to Tc. In this little region a big–bang is formed and since this moment the evolution is governed by the Friedmann’s cosmological equations.
The overall picture offered by this theory is the one of a universe in inflationary expansion, constituted by internal casual little bubbles (from this the label of “bubble universes”) where the phase transition stopped and the inflation left the place to a big–bang.
The inflationary theory solves in a formally polished way, even if not yet empirically based, the physical versions of the initial conditions problem. As far as the flatness of the universe is concerned, the inflationary theory explains it even too much well: indeed, not only  = 1 is a direct consequence of this theory, but this equality has to be confirmed exactly. In other words, an even too much close link between the inflationary theory and the flatness of the universe exists, and this is not generally a good thing, also considering that it is not yet sure al all, that  is exactly equal to 1.
The solution of the cosmological horizon problem is more subtle. As you remember, the problem is the following: a region L, with the point O as a centre, can be causally connected only if L = rO where rO is the cosmological horizon of O as defined by the equation (3). If such a condition does not hold then the points of L cannot interact each other by means of physical processes and, in particular, the region cannot be homogeneous unless it was so since the beginning. The problem is that the universe seems homogeneous, even though it consists of causally disconnected regions. The inflation theory solves this problem by supposing that before the inflation all the universe was causally connected and that physical processes able to make it homogeneous takes place at that time. Afterwards, the inflationary expansion took away the various regions of the universe at a speed higher than light. Thus, if an hypothetical region L were been included into the cosmological horizon of O before the inflation, it would exit during the inflation itself because the very fast expansion of the universe. However, at a certain point the inflation ceased and the expansion slowed down strikingly. For an observer who, after the end of the inflation, were placed in O, the problem of the cosmological horizon would pose, but it would not from the point of view of the inflation. Regions causally disconnected, are homogeneous as well, because they were connected in a epoch preceding the slow expansion we are living today.

6. The infinity in cosmology.
In order to characterise the notion of infinity, three fundamental kinds of distinction can be essentially used. It can be distinguished among an actual infinity, namely an infinity given in a complete and immediate way, a potential infinity, meant as something can be always carried on, continued and completed. This is a qualitative distinction of the infinity concept. Likewise, a quantitative distinction can be developed as well. The set theory taught us that some kind of infinity can be, let’s say, “more infinite” than other, and that a numerable set, even though infinite, contains “less” element than a continuous set. Finally also a modal distinction of the infinity concept can be used. Actually, the infinity can be thought as a infinite repetition of a finite number of possibility, or rather as a realisation of infinite possibilities. The first sense has something to do with the idea of infinity as repetition of the identical, exemplified in the conception of history as eternal return. Whereas, the second one concerns the infinite diversity, something very close to the idea of linear and “open” development of history.
Our theses is that the latter distinction only is suitable in order to characterise the infinity concept in modern cosmology. It can be deduced that this distinction is suitable for our aim by means of a methodological argumentation. It was be said that cosmology cannot be methodologically reduced to physics and that it maintains a specificity. On the other hand, the subject of cosmology is the history of the universe. Putting these two statements together, the theses that, from a methodological standpoint, cosmology as a subject is nearer historiography than physics gains strength​[2]​. The history of the universe which cosmology tries to tell, does not liken to the physical description of the fall of bodies or the decay of an atom of uranium because the initial condition problem has arisen. This point of view will be useful later on, but now it enables us to note that it is not surprising at all that the distinction we have seen exemplified in historiography, is effective in cosmology too.
However we need to show that the modal distinction is the only one satisfactory, and this requires arguments completely different. First of all it is clear that the quantitative distinction is the least relevant. The problem of continuity or discontinuity does not concern the universe as a whole, but presupposes already assuming a physical point of view, namely internal to the metaphysical frame defining the cosmology as a subject.
More difficult is catching the inadequacy of the qualitative distinction. The difference between actual infinity and potential infinity is the following: the potential infinity presupposes a container outside itself, regarding how the infinite iteration is defined; whereas, the actual infinity coincides with its container. In fact, an infinite repeatable process is such only in space and time, because the repetition happens with regard to space and time. Now, it is doubtless that the universe is expanding and this can seem an example of potential infinity, but it does not take place in a container, rather it creates its container with the expansion itself. From the point of view of the universe as a whole, not from ours, the expansion of the universe creates space and time, and does not take place in them. Thus, the expanding universe is a process coinciding with its container and the former creates the latter processing. It follows that, for the universe as a whole, the potential and actual infinity coincide and therefore this distinction is useless.
Thus, the modal distinction only can allow us to characterise the concept of infinity in cosmology. From the previous discussion about the possible ways of founding the methodological reduction of cosmology to physics, two different modal conceptions of infinity results.
We have seen the conditions to which the relativistic cosmological model admits a space and time infinite universe. However, it is evident that this infinity of the universe can develop itself within a limited number of possibilities only. The structure of the relativistic universe is determined by the values of the universal constants as the gravitational constant, Planck’s constant, the electron charge, the speed of light and so on. These constant limit the possible developments of the universe and determine a set of possibilities which is very wide, but finite. In other words, in this universe it can only be facts which does not contradict the limits imposed by the universal constants. Clearly, this is the first case of the modal distinction. The infinite development of the standard universe can be compared to the decimal expansion of a rational number. It can be quite well infinite, namely periodic, but, however long is its period, it must repeat itself, sooner or later, according to the definition of “period” itself. In the same way, the relativistic universe must exhaust sooner or later all the unexplored possibilities, and in some places some of “already seen” facts will appear. If the universe were destined for the final collapse, but it were assumed that the existence of our universe is necessary, which is the first way above mentioned, then the universe would be born again from its ashes, so that a higher level repetition would take place.
For the inflationary universe the situation is different. The bubbles of universe that form in the inflationary false vacuum are purely random. The conditions of the universe into these bubbles depend on the temperature of the phase transition, on the value of the scalar field, on the way in which the tunnel effect or the thermodynamic fluctuation take place, and so on. Thus, universes can be found with the most different and complex initial condition, universes expanding too fast in order to allow life, Einstein–de Sitter’s universes and so on. This situation perfectly corresponds to the second case of the modal distinction. Continuing the previous analogy, the infinity in an inflationary universe is like the one of a decimal expansion of a irrational number, always different and a priori unforeseeable.
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^1	  A formulation of some ideas presented here about this subject, can be found in Agazzi (1991).
^2	  Cfr. Agazzi (1995), pp. 67–76.
